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Orderly Marketing Agreements: Analysis
of United States Automobile Industry
Efforts to Obtain Import Relief
By LIBERTY MAHSHIGIAN
Member of the Class of 1983
I. INTRODUCTION
The Trade Act of 19741 represents the fundamental trade policy of
the United States. Its statement of purpose sets forth the goal of pro-
moting free world trade while fostering the economic strength of do-
mestic industries.' This policy is further embodied in the United States
commitment to the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).3 Guided by this policy, the Trade Act sets out a carefully
designed procedure for implementing import relief.
In general, a petition for import relief is submitted to the Interna-
tional Trade Commission (ITC) by a domestic industry, firm, workers'
association,4 or the President of the United States.5 The ITC is an au-
tonomous entity composed of six commissioners, appointed by the
President,6 whose function is to conduct a factual investigation and de-
termine whether import relief is warranted.7
Upon an affirmative finding by a majority of the commissioners
that a situation warrants import relief, the ITC issues its report, along
with its recommendation as to the appropriate remedy, to the President
of the United States.' An affirmative finding by the ITC triggers the
President's action,9 which may include, inter alia, unilateral import re-
strictions such as tariffs, duties, or import quotas, or bilateral restric-
1. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-
2487 (Supp. 1980)).
2. 19 U.S.C. § 2102 (1976).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 66-86.
4. 19 U.S.C. § 225 1(a)(1) (1976).
5. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1976).
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
8. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (1976).
9. 19 U.S.C. § 2252 (1976).
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tions such as an Orderly Marketing Agreement (OMA).10
A problem arises when the ITC issues a negative finding, indicat-
ing that the situation does not warrant import relief, but domestic pres-
sures for import relief persist. This often occurs when the facts do not
overwhelmingly weigh against the need for import relief. The contro-
versial nature of the situation may be reflected in divergent views
among the commissioners themselves.
An example of such a situation occurred in 1980 when the United
States automobile industry petitioned the ITC for relief from the im-
portation of Japanese automobiles. In a controversial three-to-two de-
cision, the ITC ruled that the situation did not justify import relief."I
Following the ITC determination, domestic and industrial forces con-
tinued to exert pressure on Congress for some form of relief.12 As a
result, Congress proposed resolutions to authorize the President to pro-
vide import relief in the form of an OMA notwithstanding the ITC's
finding.' 3 Ultimately, the Japanese government announced its decision
to voluntarily restrict its exports of automobiles to the United States,'
4
A formal OMA was never negotiated.
The 1980 automobile situation illustrates the problem which arises
when there is strong disagreement among the domestic industry, im-
porters, retailers, members of Congress, the President, and even among
the commissioners themselves, as to the propriety of import relief in the
particular circumstances. The Trade Act does not contain provisions
for resolving such disagreement. 15 The Act merely directs the ITC to
determine whether import relief is or is not warranted. That determi-
nation is final, subject only to a contrary finding by the ITC itself fol-
10. An Orderly Marketing Agreement is an agreement between the importing and ex-
porting governments by which the exporting nation agrees to restrain its exports targeted
toward the importing nation. For an in-depth discussion of OMAs, see iIfra text accompa-
nying notes 54-91. The five means of import relief are set forth at 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)
(1976).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 96-100.
12. See, e.g., Auto Situation: Autumn 1980 Before the Subcomm. on Trade ofthe Hotse
Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 11earings].
13. See infra text accompanying notes 101-06.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 110-12.
15. Although the ITC has six commissioners, only five participated in the automobile
import investigation and hearings. In a proceeding in which the commissioners are equally
divided with respect to whether increased imports are a substantial cause of serious injury,
the President may accept the determination agreed upon by either group of commissioners
as the determination of the ITC. 19 U.S.C. § 1330(d)(1) (1976). The controversy discussed
in this Note, however, arises when a majority of the commissioners are in agreement, but
industrial and other domestic groups disagree with the ITC determination.
[Vol, 6
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lowing a reinvestigation.1 6
The reaction to the ITC's finding in the 1980 automobile situation
was not a request for a reinvestigation. Rather, Congress responded by
proposing resolutions authorizing negotiation of an OMA. 17 Such
Congressional resolutions would be a means of obtaining import relief
completely outside the procedures in the Trade Act. The legislation
proposed by Congress, however, does not provide a solution to the in-
adequacy of the Trade Act and in fact creates a problem of greater
magnitude.
If the United States is to maintain its commitment to the funda-
mental policy of the Trade Act, the role of the ITC as an independent
fact-finding body must be preserved. The very purpose of interposing
the ITC into the process is to ensure that the decision to impose import
relief is free from both industrial and political influences."8 To author-
ize import relief in defiance of a negative ITC determination would
undermine the function of the ITC and make a mockery of the trade
policy set forth in the Trade Act.
The present Trade Act is not equipped to resolve the conflict
which emerges from a negative ITC finding when industrial and other
external forces continue to exert pressure for import relief. This defi-
ciency could be cured by a simple amendment of the Act, which would
allow an intermediate finding. With such amendment, the ITC could
make one of three findings:
1. The situation does not warrant any form of import relief;
2. the situation warrants only an OMA; or
3. the situation warrants any form of import relief, including an
OMA.
The Act presently permits the ITC to issue a finding either that the
situation warrants no form of import relief or that the situation war-
rants import restrictions or adjustment assistance for the domestic in-
dustry.19 The ITC may only issue a single type of affirmative finding,
which has the potential of triggering either bilateral import relief nego-
tiations or harsher unilateral import restrictions. The Act should be
amended to provide two different types of affirmative findings, one
16. Once the ITC issues its finding, no investigation is to be made with respect to that
same subject matter until one year has elapsed, unless the ITC finds that good cause exists
for reinvestigation. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(e) (1976).
17. See infra text accompanying note 105.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 130-41, concerning effect on the Trade Act of
1974.
19. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (1976).
19821
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which would trigger any form of import relief and another which
would trigger only negotiation of an OMA. In situations where import
relief is neither obviously warranted nor unwarranted, the ITC would
be able to recommend some form of import relief, such as an OMA, for
an ailing domestic industry without the fear that its affirmative finding
might trigger one of the harsher, unilateral types of import relief.
20
II. THE 1974 TRADE ACT
A. Background
In 1973, the Nixon administration introduced a bill providing for
comprehensive changes in existing foreign trade statutes in an effort to
forestall mandatory quotas on imports.2' The result was the Trade Act
of 1974,22 which replaced the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.23 Under
Title III of the 1974 Act, import relief is available upon a determina-
tion of unfair, unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory trade
practices. 24 Title II provides import relief measures where injury to a
domestic industry is caused by entirely fair, nondiscriminatory and
nonrestrictive trade practices.25
While continuing the policy of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act to
20. Harsher types of import relief could take the form of duties, tariff-rate quotas, or
quantitative restrictions on an imported article. See 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (1976). Most im-
portantly, such an amendment would serve three functions:
1. it would enable the FTC to respond to controversial fact situations with some
form of import relief (an OMA) rather than with a negative finding;
2. the import relief imposed would be a voluntary government-to-government
agreement, thus reducing the possibility of adverse repercussions, violation of
the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, or U.S. antitrust laws; and,
3. the autonomy and independent function of the ITC would be preserved.
21. Adams & Dirlam, Import Competition and the Trade Act of 1974: A Case Study of
Section 201 and its Interpretation by the International Trade Commission, 52 IND. L.J. 535,
539 (1977).
22. See H.R. 62, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487).
23. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 301(b)(1), 76 Stat. 884, 19
U.S.C. §§ 1901-1991 (1970) (repealed 1975).
24. Trade Act of 1974, Title III, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2271-2394 (1980).
25. Trade Act of 1974, Title II, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2270 (1980). The Trade Act's state-
ment of purpose reads, in part:
The purposes of this chapter are, through trade agreements affording mutual
benefits-
(I) to foster the economic growth of and full employment in the United States
and to strengthen economic relations between the United States and foreign
countries through open and nondiscriminatory world trade.. .[and]
(4) to provide adequate procedures to safeguard American industry and labor
against unfair or injurious import competition. ...
[Vol, 6
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foster reductions in international trade barriers, the 1974 Act simulta-
neously provides additional protection for domestic industry from the
harmful effects of foreign competition. 26 The most significant differ-
ence between the two trade acts is the change in the standard used as a
prerequisite for import relief. The 1962 Act required as a prerequisite
for import relief that imports be a major cause of a domestic industry's
injury.27 In defining "major cause," the Commission took the view that
the effect of imports had to be more important than all other causes
combined.28 Under the 1962 Act, American industries, individual
firms, and workers had been relatively unsuccessful in obtaining
relief.
29
Congress revised the injury standard in the Trade Act of 1974, re-
quiring the ITC to determine whether imports are a substantial cause
rather than a major cause of injury before making an affirmative find-
ing.30 "Substantial cause" is defined as a cause which is important and
is not less important than any other cause.31 If there is more than one
cause of injury, then imports must be at least as important as any other
cause to constitute a substantial cause.32 Furthermore, the 1974 Act
dropped the requirement that the increase in imports be the result of
prior trade concessions.33
B. Title II of the 1974 Act: Relief from Injury Caused by Entirely
Fair Import Competition
1. Institution of Proceedings
The purpose of providing import relief under Title II is to
"facilitat[e] orderly adjustment to import competition. . . .-3 Peti-
26. See Recent Developments, Trade Law, 9 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 654, 659 (1979).
27. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1991 (1970) (repealed 1975).
28. See Adams & Dirlam, supra note 21, at 561.
29. See COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, UNITED STATES INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, 49-50 (1971).
30. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1976).
31. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(4) (1976).
32. See H.R. REP. No. 471, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 46 (1973).
33. Section 301 of the 1962 Act required that the Commission make an investigation to
determine "whether, as a result in major part of concessions granted under trade agreements,
an article is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to cause, or
threaten to cause, serious injury to the domestic industry. . :' (emphasis added). Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, supra note 23. The 1974 Act dropped the phrase, "as a result in
major part of concessions granted under trade agreements." 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1976).
See also S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprntedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7186, 7205.
34. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1) (1976).
1982]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
tions for import relief "may be filed with the [ITC] by an entity, includ-
ing a trade association, firm, certified or recognized union, or group of
workers, which is representative of an industry.' ' 35 Requests for an in-
vestigation may also be submitted by the President, the United States
Trade Representative, the House Ways and Means Committee, and the
Senate Committee on Finance.3 6 The ITC may also conduct an inves-
tigation upon its own motion.37
2. The ITC Investigation and Report
Upon receiving a petition, the ITC must promptly determine
whether an article is being imported into the United States in such in-
creased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat
to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competi-
tive with the imported article.38 Before authorizing import relief meas-
ures, the ITC must make three findings:
39
1. imports of the industry in question have increased;40
2. the American industry in question has been seriously injured or
is threatened with serious injury;41 and
3. the increased imports are a substantial cuase of the serious injury
or the threat thereof.
4 2
Much controversy stems from the lack of specific criteria for the
ITC's determination of substantial cause. The statute sets forth eco-
nomic factors which the ITC should consider in making its determina-
35. Id. There is no rule specifying who or what is "representative of an industry" and
the ITC approaches the issue on a case-by-case basis. See Leonard & Foster, The Metatnor-
phosis of the U.S. International Trade Commission Under the Trade Act of 1974, 16 VA. J.
INT'L L. 719, 733-34 (1976). Mr. Leonard was Chairman of the ITC at the time he wrote this
article.




40. "Either an absolute increase or an increase relative to domestic production will sat-
isfy the criterion.... In deciding whether imports are entering the United States in 'in-
creased quantities,' the Commission examines import trends over a period of years, usually
looking no further back than 1968." See H.R. REP. No. 1644, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1974).
41. A problem with determining import-caused injury is that imports may in fact pro-
vide an incentive to the American industry to improve its performance and the quality of its
products. "[I]mports may seem to contribute to the health rather than the weakness of a
domestic industry." Adams & Dirlam, supra note 21, at 561. There are also problems in
defining a particular industry and economic problems in measuring degree of injury. See
generally id. at 544-60.
42. See id. at 540; Leonard & Foster, supra note 35, at 740; U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N,




tion.43 The economic factors listed are not, however, intended to be
exclusive. The ITC is directed by statute to take into account all eco-
nomic factors which it considers relevant. 4 For example, the ITC
studies the efforts by firms and workers in the industry to compete more
effectively with imports. 45 If the ITC finds that imports are a substan-
tial cause of injury to a domestic industry, the ITC reports its affirma-
tive finding to the President,4s recommending a type and level of
import relief sufficient to compensate for the injury.' 7
3. President's Action upon Receipt of the ITC Report
Upon receipt of an ITC report containing an affirmative determi-
nation, the President may either.
1. accept the ITC's recommended remedy,4
2. conduct an additional inquiry, calling on the ITC and other
sources for additional information 4 9
3. reject the ITC recommendation and propose his own remedy,50
or
4. determine that the provision of import relief is not in the na-
tional economic interest of the United States and that he will not
provide import relief.51
The determination of the exact terms of the relief is up to the Presi-
dent 52 Relevant factors he may consider are listed in the statute.
5 3
43. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2) (1976).
44. Id.
45. See Lorinczi & O'Sullivan, Import Relief under the Trade Act of 1974, 22:6 PAi.c.
LAW. 61, 62 (1976).
46. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (1976).
47. Id.
48. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b) (1976).
49. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(d) (1976).
50. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) (1976).
51. Id.
52. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b) (1976).
53. The President may take into account the extent to which workers and firms in the
industry are receiving or are likely to receive adjustment assistance, the efforts made by the
industry to adjust to import competition, the effect of import relief on consumers and on
competition in the domestic markets for articles produced by the industry, the effect of im-
port relief on the international economic interests of the United States, the possibility of
becoming liable for compensating foreign industries as a result of international obligations,
the geographic concentration of imported products marketed in the United States, the extent
to which the United States market is the focal point for exports of such article by reason of
restraints on exports of such article to third country markets, the economic and social costs
which would be incurred by taxpayers, communities, and workers, if import relief were or
were not provided, and any other considerations he may deem relevant. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)
(1976).
1982]
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When the President decides to provide import relief, he must
transmit to Congress a report setting forth the action to be taken.5 4 If
the President's announced action differs from the action recommended
by the ITC, or if the President determines that he will not provide im-
port relief, Congress may override the President's decision and uphold
the ITC recommendation.-"
The types of import relief available under section 203 of the Trade
Act include:
1. an increase in, or imposition of, a duty;
2. a tariff-rate quota;
3. modification of, or imposition of, an import quota;
4. the negotiation of an OMA with foreign countries, limiting the
exports from foreign countries; or
5. any combination of these actions.
56
The President may negotiate an OMA after he has imposed one of the
other forms of import relief, in which case the OMA would replace
such other relief.57 If the President negotiates an OMA and such agree-
ment does not continue to be effective, he may impose an alternative
form of import relief as listed in the statute.58
III. ORDERLY MARKETING AGREEMENTS
An Orderly Marketing Agreement is "an arrangement by which
national governments agree among themselves, often tacitly and with-
out any legal force, in the sense of a treaty, that an exporting country
will restrain its exports targeted toward an importing country with
which it is negotiating." '59 OMAs involve formal and informal govern-
ment-to-government agreements, in which the governments deal di-
rectly with each other and negotiate the OMA. Most government-to-
government agreements are intended to be binding.60 This type of ex-
port-restraint agreement may be monitored and enforced by the im-
porting country's own customs officials. Agreements negotiated
pursuant to section 203 of the Trade Act61 and based upon prior find-
54. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(b)(1) (1976).
55. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (1976). See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PuB. No. 756, SPE-
CIALTY STEEL (Jan. 1976).
56. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as section 203 of the Trade Act].
57. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(e)(2) (1976).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(e)(3) (1976).
59. Jackson, Orderly Marketing 4rrangbments,,4 Panel, 72 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 1
(1978) [hereinafter cited as OM4 Panel].
60. See id. at 2.
61. See supra text accompanying note 56.
[Vol. 6
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ings of injury to domestic producers by the ITC are regarded as
OMAs. 62
Other restraint arrangements are regarded as Voluntary Restraint
Agreements (VRAs).63 These agreements generally do not involve gov-
ernment-to-government discourse and are less formal than OMAs. 64
The United States government merely encourages a foreign industry or
government to exercise self-restraint in the exportation of its goods to
the United States market. VRAs are enforced only by the exporting
country and are not intended to be binding.65
A. OMAs in the Context of GATT
In 1947, twenty-three countries met in Geneva and established a
framework for periodic international negotiations to deal with tariff re-
ductions and eliminate discrimination and unfair trade practices."6
This framework was set forth in a document entitled General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).67 The United States Congress was
opposed to joining this international trade organization;68 nevertheless,
by way of an executive agreement signed by President Truman,69 the
United States joined twenty-two other countries in signing a Protocol
of Provisional Application of the GATT.7°
Article I of GATT sets forth the contracting parties' commitment
to "most-favored nation" treatment: "any advantage, favour, privilege
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originat-
ing in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for
the territories of all other contracting parties."' 7' This commitment has
62. See OMA Panel, supra note 59, at 12.
63. Id. at 1.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See generally M. KOSTECKI, EAST-WEST TRADE AND THE GATT SysTErt (1979).
67. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. AS T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
68. See Gryzbowski, Reid & Stepanyenko, Towards Integrated M4anagement of Inierna-
tional Trade-The U.S. Trade Act of 1974, 26 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 283, 297-98 (1977).
69. On December 16, 1947, President Truman issued Proclamation 2761A, "Carrying
Out General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade Concluded at Geneva, October 30, 1947:'
See Proclamation No. 2761A, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1947).
70. GATT came into force for the United States on January 1, 1948, pursuant to a
protocol for provisional application. GATT, supra note 67, at 3. To date, 87 countries have
joined the GATT organization. Pine, GA7T Caseload Aises as International Trade Meets
Serious Strains, Wall St. J., April 9, 1982, at I, coL 6.
71. GATT, art I(1), supra note 67, 61 Stat. A12, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 8, 55 U.N.T.S. at
1982]
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been amended to some extent by the 1979 Tokyo Round of the Mul-
tinational Trade Negotiations, which provides that developed countries
may accord developing countries certain tariff and nontariff preferen-
tial treatment within the context of GATT.72
GATT contains a number of escape clauses which permit a mem-
ber country to respond to domestic pressures while remaining a partici-
pant in the Agreement. Article XIX permits a contracting party to
suspend obligations under GATT
[i]f, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the
obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement
... any product is being imported into the territory of that con-
tracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions
as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that
territory of like or directly competitive products ....
Such safeguard actions should be used without discrimination against
particular exporting countries because of the contracting parties' com-
mitment to most-favored nation treatment.74 OMAs, however, involve
government-to-government export restriction agreements. Thus, by
their very nature, OMAs involve discrimination against certain export-
ing states rather than nondiscriminatory action on a product-sector se-
lective basis.75
Title II of the Trade Act of 1974 is the present United States legis-
lation implementing the escape clause provisions of Article XIX of
GATT.76 Unlike Article XIX, however, import relief under the Trade
Act of 1974 carries no prerequisite that increased imports be the result
of unforeseen developments or of GATT obligations."
Orderly Marketing Agreements, as agreements negotiated between
governments, are distinguishable from unilateral trade restraint actions
in the context of GATT. The exporting nation's acquiescence should
preclude it from asserting any GATT violation.78
72. See generally Recent Developments, International Trade.- G 77 Tokyo Round, 20
HARV. INT'L L.J. 695 (1979); Meier, The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and
Developing Countries, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 13 (1980); Strauss, The Tokyo Round- Is
Meaning and Effect, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 151 (1979).
73. GATT, art. XIX(l)(a), supra note 67, at 58.
74. See supra text accompanying note 71.
75. See GAT77s Trade Talks, Economist, June 17, 1978, at 86, 87.
76. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2270 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 34-58. Article
XIX requires that the increased imports must be the result of "unforeseen developments"
and of the effect of obligations incurred under GATT. See supra text accompanying note
73.
77. See OM4 Panel, supra note 59, at 2.
78. Absent any "genuine claim of coercion or some other recognized Vienna Conven-
[Vol. 6
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In the 1978 case of Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter,79 shoe importers.
brought an action to set aside two OMAs negotiated between the
United States and the governments of the Republic of China (Taiwan)
and the Republic of South Korea. President Carter had ordered the
negotiation of OMAs pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974, after receiving
a report from the ITC. 0 Plaintiffs in Sneaker Circus argued that the
OMAs violated the most-favored nation provisions in GATT.8' Judge
Costantino held this argument to be without merit on the ground that
"Congress has never ratified GATT."8 2 Judge Costantino continued,
"Moreover, even if GATT were applicable, it specifically provides for
suspension of the obligations of the Agreement in the event that im-
ports of a given product into any country cause or threaten serious in-
jury to domestic producers of the same or competitive products. ' 3 The
court noted that the language of section 201(b)(1) of the Trade Act
very closely tracks the language of the Article XIX GATT escape
clause.85 Thus, it seems that an OMA negotiated pursuant to section
201 of the Trade Act of 197486 raises no GATT violation.
B. OMAs in the Context of Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation
Nations attempt to limit disruptive trade practices by entering into
bilateral treaties such as the 1953 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation between the United States and Japan.87 This treaty con-
tains two key concepts: national treatment, and most-favored nation
treatment.88 National treatment is defined as "treatment accorded
within the territories of a Party upon terms no less favorable than the
treatment accorded therein, in like situations, to nationals, companies,
tion ground, or other ground in international law for avoiding a treaty or obligation," the
exporting nation's acquiescence should preclude it from asserting any GATT violation.
OAL4 Panel, supra note 59, at 7 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 46-
64, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27).
79. 457 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), afd 614 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979).
80. 457 F. Supp. at 789.
81. Id. at 795.
82. Id. (citing United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 575 n.2 (C.C.P.A.
1975)).
83. 457 F. Supp. at 795 (citing GATT art. XIX).
84. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1976).
85. 457 F. Supp. at 795 n.36.
86. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1976).
87. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
4 U.S.T. 2063, T.LA.S. No. 2863.
88. See Note, Indexes of Selected Bilateral Treaties: United States and Japan, 2 HAS-
TINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. Rv. 105, 117 (1979).
1982]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
products, vessels, or other objects, as the case may be, of such Party."89
Most-favored nation treatment is defined as "treatment accorded
within the territories of a Party upon terms no less favorable than the
treatment accorded therein, in like situations, to nationals, companies,
products, vessels or other objects, as the case may be, of any third coun-
try."90  Under most-favored nation treatment, no restrictions or
prohibitions on import or export of products may be imposed unless
similar restrictions apply to third countries. Restrictions may be im-
posed on noncommercial grounds, however, or to prevent deceptive or
unfair trade practices.9"
The United States District Court in Sneaker Circus held that
OMAs did not violate the most-favored nation provisions of the treaties
at issue because the import quotas under OMAs were negotiated, not
imposed.92 The court noted that the Trade Act of 1974 permits the
President to act without regard to most-favored nation status93 and spe-
cifically provides that the President may negotiate OMAs. 94 Regarding
inconsistent provisions between the Trade Act of 1974 and friendship
treaties entered into prior to 1974, the court added: "[T]o the extent
that such provisions of the Act are inconsistent with the provisions of
the Friendship Treaties, the provisions of the Act would apply since
they were enacted subsequent to those treaties." 9
IV. AN ILLUSTRATIVE PROBLEM: UNITED STATES
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY, 1980-81
In 1980, pursuant to petitions filed by the United Auto Workers
union and Ford Motor Company, the ITC conducted an investigation
into the effect of Japanese automobile imports on the United States
automobile industry.96 On November 10, 1980, the ITC issued its de-
89. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, supra note 87, art. XXII, at 2079,
90. Id.
91. Id. art. XIV, at 2074.
92. 457 F. Supp. at 795.
93. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2253(k)(1) (1976)).
94. Id. at 795 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2253(k)(1) (1976)).
95. Id. at 795 (citing Akins v. United States, 551 F.2d 1222, 1229 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
96. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 1110, CERTAIN MOTOR VEHICLES AND CUR-
TAIN CHASSIS AND BODIES THEREFORE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIOATION
TA-210-44 UNDER SEcTION 201 OF THE TRADE AcT OF 1974, at I (Dec. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as ITC Report]. The United States automobile industry experienced an accelerated
deterioration in 1979-80. United States production of automobiles declined eight percent in
1979; production was down 29% in the first six months of 1980 compared to production in
the same period in 1979. Id. at A-27. The average number of workers employed in United
States establishments producing passenger automobiles and light trucks declined by three
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termination by a vote of three-to-two that Japanese automobile imports
were not a substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic auto
industry.
97
According to the ITC, the plight of the United States automobile
industry was not the result of import competition alone, but rather a
result of other factors including:
1. the decline in demand for automobiles, brought about by the
general decline in overall economic activity,
2. difficulties in the cost and availability of consumer credit; and
3. the shift in demand from large automobiles to small, fuel-effi-
cient cars, coupled with domestic producers' failure to satisfy
that new demand.9s
Most significant was the ITC's conclusion that import relief would
not aid the automobile producers' recovery: "The transformation of the
industry will take place in the absence of any import relief and would
not be speeded by relief. . . . The record shows that all investment
plans for domestic production are independent of import relief."'99 Per-
haps another consequential factor is that at the time of the ITC finding,
neither President Carter nor President-elect Reagan appeared willing
to move forward to obtain an OMA. Early in his campaign, Presiden-
tial candidate Reagan expressed his commitment to free trade and his
opposition to import restrictions on automobiles" 0t
percent in 1979; employment declined approximately 22% percent in the first six months of
1980 compared to employment during the same period in 1979. Id. at A-38. Aggregate net
operating profit fell by 76% in 1979, from S5.6 billion in 1978 to $1.3 billion in 1979; during
the first six months of 1980, the industry reported a loss of $2.9 billion. Id. at A-43.
97. Id. at 1.
98. Id. at 21, 34-35, 67, 133-34, A-67 to -71. See also Issues Relating to the Domestic
Auto Industry Hearing on .396 Before the Subcomnm on INti Trade of the Senate Comn= on
Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, 180, 185 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings 97th
Cong.] (statement of Robert M. McElwaine, President, Amer. Int'l Automobile Dealers
Assoc.).
99. ITC Report, supra note 96, at 161-62. See Hearings 97th Cong., PL 1,supra note 98,
at 189.
100. President Reagan has stated:
We must continue to resist rising protectionist pressures to keep the world trading
system open. Import limitations only lead to foreign retaliation and increased do-
mestic unemployment. . . .Of course free trade should be reciprocal. We should
not be expected to stand idly by. It better serves our interests to negotiate for a
reduction in a foreign country's trade barriers than to erect more barriers of our
own.
Hearings, supra, note 12, at 6.
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A. Congressional Response to the Negative Finding of the ITC
In the absence of a determination by the ITC that the injury was
caused by imports, the President lacked the authority under section 203
of the Trade Act of 1974 to negotiate an OMA with the Japanese
government.' 0
The Ninety-Sixth Congress proposed two joint resolutions to give
the President authority to negotiate with foreign governments to limit
automobile imports notwithstanding a negative finding by the ITC. t0 2
The resolutions would give the President authority to negotiate with
representatives of foreign governments and enter into and carry out
import restriction agreements "whenever the President determines such
action appropriate."'' 0 3 Neither resolution became law, both dying in
the December congressional rush to adjourn."
The Ninety-Seventh Congress also proposed three resolutions
which would authorize and encourage the President to negotiate an
OMA notwithstanding the ITC's negative finding.0 5 These proposed
resolutions became moot after the unilateral export restriction was un-
dertaken by the Japanese. In addition to these resolutions, the United
States Senate proposed legislation to impose unilateral quotas on the
importation of automobiles from Japan during 1981, 1982, and 1983.106
101. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1976). The statute directs the President to take action to pro-
vide import relief, unless he decides such relief is not in the national economic interest of the
United States "after receiving a report from the commission."
102. S.J. Res. 193, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.J. Res. 598, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. S.J. Res. 5, proposed on Jan. 5, 1981, before the Senate Finance Committee. See
Hearings 97th Cong., Pt. 1, supra note 98, at 25-27. This resolution would authorize the
President to negotiate with foreign governments to obtain import restraint agreements on
automobiles, trucks, and auto parts used in assembly. That authority would expire on July
1, 1984. Any agreement would expire on June 30, 1984. H.R.J. Res. 5 was also proposed on
Jan. 5, 1981, before the House Ways and Means Committee. See Hearings 97th Cong., Pt, 2,
supra note 98. H.R. Cong. Res. 80 was proposed on Feb. 26, 1981, before the House Ways
and Means Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This concurrent resolu-
tion urged the President to enter into negotiations with representatives of the government of
Japan with respect to a temporary restraint in Japan's exportation of automobiles into the
United States, an equitable relationship between prices charged in domestic and foreign
sales, and elimination of trade barriers affecting purchase of American products in Japan.
106. S. 2194, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 5667, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Con-
gress has also introduced proposals to establish domestic content requirements for motor
vehicles sold in the United States; S. 2300, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 5597, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 6491,97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Simison, IAW vs. Japan, Car-





In early April of 1981, the United States government sent a special
trade mission to Japan.'07 The briefing mission was pointedly de-
scribed by the United States government as a low-level group whose
sole responsibility would be to explain the contents of automobile ex-
port restraint proposals. Negotiations or discussions on export levels
were specifically excluded from the mission's mandate. 08 Later that
month Ambassador William Brock, the United States special trade rep-
resentative, traveled to Tokyo to conduct general discussions concern-
ing United States-Japan trade policy. However, no negotiations as
such took place,109 and the United States did not enter into any formal
agreement for restriction of Japanese automobile exports. Shortly after
Ambassador Brock left Japan, the Japanese government announced its
decision to "voluntarily" restrict its automobile exports to the United
States. 0 The Japanese export restraint program will run for two years
from April 1, 1981."' In addition, the Japanese government said it will
reevaluate the situation in the third year to determine whether the re-
strictions should be continued. "2
107. See Hearings 97th Cong., Pt. 2,.supra note 98. The text of S.396 is reprinted, td. at 3.
When Deputy Vice Minister of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
Naohiro Amaya returned to Japan from Washington in February 1981, the feeling at MITI
was that the United States government wanted a commitment from Japan that it would
restrict car exports to the United States and that cabinet-level negotiations would soon be-
gin. In March 1981, MITI officials announced that the Reagan administration would send a
briefing mission to Japan on April 6, in conjunction with the release of proposals by Presi-
dent Reagan's cabinet-level auto task force. According to MITI, the briefing mission would
discuss details of method and suitable time frame for the Japanese export restraint program.
Lincoln, Automobiles: No Roadmaps Available, 14 JAPAN INSIGHT [Japan Economic Insti-
tute], April 10, 1981, at 1-2.
108. Id. at 2.
109. See Remarks of Secretary of State Alexander Haig, in U.S. Dept of St. Bull., Press
Release 72 of Mar. 25, 1981, 81"2050 at 29-30. Following Japanese Foreign Minister Ito's
official visit to Washington, D.C., March 23-24, 1981, Secretary of State Haig informed the
press that there had been meetings in which Foreign Minister Ito had been presented with
the situation of the American auto industry, but that no agreement had been made as to
what specific steps might be desirable on the part of Japan. Secretary Haig stated in his
press release, "We are merely exchanging views on this sensitive and complex matter, and
we will continue to do so." Id. at 30.
110. See Mr. .Reagan r 6#21 to BigAuto, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1981, at 22, col 1. On May
1, 1981, a nonagreement emerged from the nonnegotiations between United States Special
Trade Representative William Brock and Japanese government officials, which put an end
to the long and tortuous conflict over imports of Japanese-made automobiles. Lincoln,
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Much public skepticism exists as to the actual voluntariness of this
totally unilateral action undertaken by the Japanese. 1 3 Prior to the
nonnegotiations of April 1981, it seemed highly unlikely that the Japa-
nese government would voluntarily agree to limit its automobile ex-
ports. The Japanese automakers were then under pressure from the
European market to voluntarily cut back their sales." 4 Those Euro-
pean restrictions, together with the Japanese desire to expand their
manufacturing capacity, would indicate that Japan had an even
stronger need to sell more cars in an unregulated American market. "I
However, faced with the Japanese government's offer to restrict ex-
ports, with "Ambassador Brock's acquiescence, and [with] the resulting
collapse of congressional action, the Japanese automobile manufactur-
ers had no choice but to accept the decision. Any other response would
have brought charges of obstructionism."
'' 6
C. Effect of Proposed Legislation
The legislation proposed in response to the ITC's negative finding
raises several legal issues. As discussed below, legislation authorizing
negotiation of an OMA after such action has been precluded by a nega-
tive ITC determination might conflict with United States general trade
policy, the United States obligations under GATT, and the United
States antitrust laws. More importantly, the events that transpired sub-
sequent to the ITC's negative determination reveal a flaw in the 1974
Trade Act itself. the procedure does not provide for a method of ensur-
ing the finality of an ITC determination, while simultaneously appeas-
ing political and economic pressures for import relief.
Imposing import relief in response to pressures exerted by a partic-
ular domestic industry would signal a retreat from the free trade policy
113. See, e.g., Mr. Reagan's Gift to Big Auto, supra, note 110; Pine, Trade Representative
Brock Battles Threat ofProtectionism in U.S., Other Countries, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1982, at
48, col. 1. As Edward Lincoln has stated:
To preserve the administration's free-trade image, and presumably to avoid anti-
trust complications, the Brock trip was not billed as a negotiating exercise. [Brock]
was there only to advise the Japanese government as to whether its policies would
appease Congress. No one was fooled by this charade. For all practical purposes,
the events of the past few weeks amounted to negotiations; the Reagan administra-
tion cannot escape responsibility for presiding over a protectionist settlement of the
automobile issue.
Lincoln, supra note 110, at 2.
114. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 7.
115. See Auto Situation: Autumn 1980 Before the Subcomm. on Trade ofthe House Ways
andMeans Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980) (statement of Sen. Howard Metzenbaum),
116. Lincoln, supra note 110, at 2.
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expressed in the Trade Act. It would also undermine one of the major
achievements of United States trade policy in the 1979 GATT Tokyo
Round negotiations--the winning of commitments by other govern-
ments to employ the same type of open, careful, and fair administrative
procedures that the United States employs before imposing limitations
on imports.'
17
1. GATT and Antitrust Ramifications
More specifically, legislation such as that proposed by the Ninety-
Seventh Congress would have adverse ramifications under GATT. Im-
position of a legislated import quota following a negative ITC finding
could be held contrary to United States obligations under GATT. "Ja-
pan, then, could seek compensation in the form of other trade conces-
sions, or could withdraw concessions on other products of interest to
the United States.""" The procedures set out in the Trade Act were
specifically designed to provide import relief without violating the
United States obligations under GATT.
Article XIX of GATT provides an escape clause from GATT obli-
gations." 9 Article XIX permits a member country to impose quantita-
tive import restrictions only in certain circumstances in which imports
"cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers."' 20 Through-
out the thirty-three years of GATT's operation, "the United States has
implemented this principle by requiring that petitioners follow well-
defined procedures and obtain an affirmative determination from the
ITC."121
An affirmative ITC finding signifies that imports are a cause of, or
threaten to cause, serious injury to a domestic industry.12 Thus, the
ITC affirmative finding assures compliance with GATT and the escape
clause provision of Article XIX. An ITC negative finding, however,
implies that the preconditions of Article XIX have not been satisfied.
Therefore, any import restriction imposed would be likely to constitute
a violation of GATT.
117. Hearings 97th Cong., Pt. 1, supra note 98, at 190 (statement of Robert M.
McElwaine). The requisite procedure for obtaining import relief is set forth in sections 201-
203 of the 1974 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1976).
118. Hearings 97th Cong., Pt. 2, supra note 98, at 80 (statement of Malcolm Baldridge,
Secretary of Commerce).
119. See supra text accompanying note 73.
120. GATT, art. XIX(1)(a), supra note 67, at 260.
121. Hearings 97th Cong., Pt. 1, supra note 98, at 190 (statement of Robert M.
McElwaine).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 38-46.
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The proposed legislation also involves risk of violation of the
United States antitrust laws. A Senate Joint Resolution states that the
act of entering into an automobile export agreement, and actions neces-
sary to implement any agreement, would be exempt from antitrust laws
of the United States. 123 It was, however, the threat of antitrust viola-
tions which deterred negotiation of a formal OMA after the ITC nega-
tive determination. 24 Absent an affirmative finding by the ITC that
imports are a substantial cause of a domestic industry's injury, any con-
gressional action to restrict imports or any formal imposition of export
limitations by the foreign government involved could violate the intent
and policy of United States antitrust laws.1
2 -
Japanese automakers' compliance with the quota set by the Japa-
nese Ministry of International Trade and Industry would not expose
the Japanese industry to antitrust problems in the United States, since
the automakers can argue that they were compelled to restrict exports.
If compelled by their government, actions by foreign firms in restraint
of trade in the United States are not considered to be violations of
United States antitrust law.'
26
The question, however, of whether the United States government
can press for restrictions on imports outside the framework prescribed
in United States trade laws without violating antitrust laws has never
been resolved in court. In December of 1980, the United States De-
partment of Justice issued an opinion that the President has the legal
authority to negotiate an agreement restricting imports, and that an
agreement between the United States and Japanese governments
reached as a result of such negotiations would not be an antitrust viola-
tion if the foreign government required compliance by its national
firms through its own legal process.
127
In Sneaker Circus, the court discussed the implications of OMAs
on United States antitrust laws. The court held that if the finding of the
ITC and actions by the President were in conformity with the provi-
sions of the Trade Act, then the ITC determination, the President's ac-
tion, and the OMAs resulting therefrom are not in violation of section 1
123. SJ. Res. 5, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 25-27 (1981).
124. See Lincoln, supra note 107.
125. Hearings 97h Cong. Pt. 1, supra note 98, at 191 (statement of Robert M
McElwaine). See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § I-XX (1976).
126. Lincoln, supra note 110, at 2.
127. Dec. 29, 1980, letter from Assoc. Att'y Gen. John H. Shenefield to Sen. Carl Levin
of Michigan in response to Sen. Levin's written inquiry. See Hearings 97th Cong. Pt. 1,
supra note 98, at 156 (statement of Howard D. Samuel).
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of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 28 Citing the United States Supreme
Court in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., the district court stated, "Where a restraint upon trade. . . is the
result of valid governmental action. . . no violation of the [Sherman]
Act can be made out.'1
29
No court has yet specifically addressed the antitrust ramifications
of an OMA procured outside the provisions and procedures of the
Trade Act. The Sneaker Circus decision and the Supreme Court's
holding in Eastern Railroad, however, give no assurance that a non-
Trade Act OMA would be immune from antitrust laws.
2. Effect on the Trade Act of 1974
Aside from the GATT and antitrust implications, an OMA negoti-
ated subsequent to an ITC negative finding would do great violence to
the Trade Act itself. Of major concern is whether the President has or
should have the authority to negotiate an OMA on his own initiative
without fulfilling the procedural requirements of the Trade Act of 1974.
In order to achieve the fundamental goal of the Trade Act of 1974,
which is the promotion of free trade with some protection of domestic
industries, Congress delegated the power to determine the necessity of
import relief to an independent fact-finding body, the ITC.130 The de-
cision of the ITC should be final and determinative, otherwise its func-
tion in the import relief process would be essentially meaningless. If
Congress and the President were to act without regard to an ITC deter-
mination that circumstances did not warrant import relief, there would
be no purpose to the statutory procedural requirements.
A conflict exists between the need to preserve the independent role
of the ITC and the desire to respond to domestic pressures for import
relief. Under the present statute, a negative finding by the ITC pre-
cludes any type of import relief.13 Pressures from the ailing domestic
industry and the effect of the industry's failures upon the national econ-
omy, however, prompted Congress and the President to respond by at-
tempting to effectuate some form of import relief in disregard of the
ITC's finding.
The proposed legislation of the Ninety-Sixth and Ninety-Seventh
Congresses raise important legal questions which are likely to recur.
128. 457 F. Supp. at 796.
129. Id. (citing Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961) (emphasis added)).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 6, 38-42.
131. See supra text accompanying note 101.
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The question of Presidential authority to act without regard to an ITC
determination or the procedures established in the Trade Act has not
been addressed judicially. Case law does, however, provide some au-
thority as to the scope of the President's powers in negotiating an
OMA.
In 1974, a consumer group, Consumers Union, brought suit chal-
lenging voluntary, nonbinding export restraint agreements entered into
between the United States and foreign steel-producer associations,
outside the scope of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (precursor to the
Trade Act of 1974).132 The Consumers Union court held that the Presi-
dent was not required to follow statutory procedures for restricting im-
ports as long as his efforts did not create legally enforceable
obligations.
133
In light of the looser standard in the 1974 Act of substantial cause
rather than major cause, it is debatable whether Consumers Union
would have been decided differently under the Trade Act of 1974. The
Senate Finance Committee, in its report of the bill that became the
Trade Act of 1974, noted that the President had been resorting to non-
binding voluntary export restraint agreements because of the difficulty
under the 1962 Act of proving that imports were a major cause of in-
jury.134 The 1974 Act relaxed the standard to substantial cause, thus
increasing the opportunity for obtaining import relief, including
OMAs. 11
By relaxing the standard in the 1974 Act, Congress enabled more
OMAs to be negotiated pursuant to the explicit procedural require-
ments of the Act. Consumers Union, however, involved a VRA, not an
OMA. VRAs, whereby the President merely urges an exporting indus-
try or nation to voluntarily limit its exports aimed toward the United
States, do not involve government-to-government agreements and are
not governed by statutory prerequisites, even under the 1974 Act,' 3
132. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
133. 1d. at 143-44.
134. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 33, at 7263.
135. OMA Panel, supra note 59, at 3. Professor Kirgis states:
One could infer from this that Congress intended to preempt the President's au-
thority to participate in even the non-binding type of arrangement, unless the full
statutory investigation procedure set out in the 1974 Act is followed. But. . .there
is real doubt whether Congress can preclude the President from negotiating ar-
rangements which purport neither to bind the United States under international
law nor to create federal law in the United States.
Id. Kirgis concludes that if the President negotiates a nonbinding OMA, the arrangement
will be upheld even if the President did not strictly adhere to the statutory procedures be-
cause of the President's own foreign affairs powers to negotiate under the Constitution, Id.
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Thus, Consumers Union does not support the argument that the Presi-
dent may negotiate an OMA without following the procedural require-
ments of the Trade Act.
It is arguable that the President should have authority to negotiate
an OMA notwithstanding a negative finding by the ITC because the
President has already been given the authority to exercise discretion in
the substance of OMAs. The substance of the agreements constitutes a
political question beyond the scope of judicial review.
136
On the other hand, the President's power to promulgate import
relief under the Trade Act is not absolute. For example, section 203 of
the Act prohibits the President from increasing tariffs absent an affirm-
ative determination by the ITC. 37 Furthermore, if the President de-
cides to take action other than that recommended by the ITC, or if he
decides that he will not provide import relief, Congress may disapprove
the President's decision, and the action recommended by the ITC will
take effect.
138
The proposed legislation provided preconditions to the President's
power to negotiate an OMA, thus ensuring that import relief would
only be implemented when imports were the cause of a domestic indus-
try's injury. Senate Joint Resolution 5, subsection (b), would place two
preconditions on any negotiation:
1. the President would have to consider that the imports were caus-
ing, or threatening to cause, serious injury to the domestic indus-
try;, and
2. the President would have to be satisfied that the domestic indus-
try has exhausted remedies under section 201 of the Trade Act of
1974.139
In effect, this subsection would authorize the President to assume the
fact-finding role that was assigned by Congress to the ITC.
OMAs negotiated subsequent to a negative determination by the
ITC would be contrary to the autonomy and fact-finding power Con-
gress has delegated to that body. Until now, Congress has maintained
the position of the ITC as an independent body, responsive to both the
President and Congress, but under the direct control of neither. 40
136. Sneaker Circus, 457 F. Supp. at 791.
137. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(f)(1)-(4) (1976).
138. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (1976).
139. SJ. Res. 5, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
140. In a report on the proposed Trade Act of 1974, the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee remarked that the ITC's judgment relating to injury from imports would be
determinative:
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Judicial review of ITC decisions is limited in scope, and courts will
defer to the ITC's inherent expertise as a finder of facts. In defining the
scope of judicial review of an ITC determination, the United States
District Court stated in Sneaker Circus that
[i]ndeed, it would be both unfeasible and impractical for the court to
attempt to review the merits of a determination which rests on com-
plex and subtle evaluations of technical economic data about which
the ITC is far more expert than the court. . . . The court must de-
termine only whether the ITC decision was arbitrary, capricious or
an abuse of discretion.
14 1
Congress created the section 201 process for implementing import
relief, and specifically delegated to the ITC some of its constitutional
authority to regulate foreign commerce. Congress also purposefully in-
terposed the ITC into the process in order to ensure that the decision to
recommend import relief would not be subject to political pressures.
The proposed legislation would virtually destroy the authority and
independence of the ITC by allowing Congress to override the deci-
sions of the ITC whenever those decisions turn out to be unpopular.
V. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION
The controversy surrounding the propriety of import relief in the
automobile industry situation illustrates the dilemma presented by a
negative determination of the ITC, especially when the finding reflects
strong disagreement among the commissioners themselves. The vote
against authorizing import relief for the United States automobile in-
dustry in 1980 was three-to-two. Such a divided determination of fact
implies that import relief is not blatantly unwarranted. When the facts
are so close, it is inevitable that domestic pressures for some form of
relief will continue beyond the issuance of the ITC's determination.
Such a situation leads to congressional and executive attempts to pro-
vide relief for the domestic industry despite the ITC's negative
determination.
Implementation of import relief in defiance of the ITC's negative
determination creates adverse implications on United States trade pol-
The Committee did not intend that an industry would satisfy the eligibility criteria
for import relief by showing that all, or some of the enumerated factors, were pres-
ent at the time of its petition to the Tariff Commission [predecessor to the ITC].
That is a judgment to be made by the Tariff Commission on the basis of all factors
it considers relevant.
H.R. REP. No. 571, 39d Cong., Ist Sess. at 47 (1973).
141. 457 F. Supp. at 787.
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icy and has ramifications on United States obligations under GATT as
well as United States antitrust laws. Most significantly, such action un-
dermines the essential function of the ITC as weU as the carefully
crafted procedures established in the Trade Act of 1974. The need to
abrogate the procedures established by the Trade Act can be eliminated
by a minor amendment of the statute. Such an amendment would pro-
vide a method to appease domestic pressures for import relief in a man-
ner consistent with the policy of the Act.
Under present law, a single affirmative ITC finding has the poten-
tial of triggering a number of types of relief, including both voluntary
government-to-government agreements and unilaterally imposed im-
port restrictions, tariffs, and duties.1 42 The effects of voluntary agree-
ments and unilateral action are distinguishable, and the standards and
procedures giving rise to the two types of actions should be different.
The ITC should be permitted to issue an affirmative determination
that imports are a cause of a domestic industry's injury, but that the
only type of relief warranted by the situation is an OMA. In a contro-
versial factual situation, such as the one analyzed herein, the ITC
would be more likely to issue a finding authorizing relief if the only
type available would be a voluntary agreement between the two gov-
ernments. Thus, the determination that import relief is warranted
would continue to be based upon the ITC's independent factual investi-
gation, rather than upon the political and industrial pressures which
would influence a congressional or executive determination. Most im-
portantly, the ITC's status as an independent fact-finding body would
be preserved. As a result, the United States would uphold its commit-
ment to the Trade Act's fundamental purpose: to promote free world
trade by imposing import restrictions only when justified by exigent
circumstances.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
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